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Problems in Epicurean Physics
Modern interpretations of ancient atomic theory have attributed to Epicurus, 
and to some extent also to Democritus, some surprising and ingenious propositions. 
These propositions betray a serious involvement on the part of the atomists with 
the physical and philosophical implications of their doctrines on matter and the 
void. In place of commonsensical notions about small hard bodies falling or 
knocking about in space, we now find such sophisticated ideas as quantized space 
and time, discontinuous motion, theoretical minima--ideas comparable in their 
subtlety to the Eleatic paradoxes, which as it seems, they were intended to resolve. 
The advantage of these new interpretations is that they render a more satisfactory 
account of difficult arguments and principles in the Epicurean texts; they place 
the atomists squarely in the tradition of ancient philosophy from Parmenides 
through Aristotle; and they reveal a degree of philosophical intelligence behind 
ancient atomism that makes it a stimulating subject for investigation. At the same 
time, they raise new problems, inconsistencies and paradoxes which demand still 
further analytical machinery for their solution. Not that there is any cause for 
consternation in this fact. Even the most refined theories of modern physics pro­
duce singularities, limiting cases and other conceptual potholes where the struc­
ture breaks down. It is entirely to be expected that a deeper analysis of the 
premises of ancient atomism should uncover new dilemmas, which in turn make fresh 
demands on the theory. There is, nevertheless, the real danger that, in pursuing 
such lines of speculation as far as possible, we may begin to lose touch with the 
ancient texts, and wander about in intellectual regions which, however fascinating 
in themselves, have little or nothing to do with the thought of Epicurus and his 
followers. That is, even if the problems we discover are real ones for the theory, 
the Epicureans may have been unaware of them or unimpressed by them, and, in either 
case, not given them much thought. But sometimes engagement with the theoretical 
issues in their own right points to new significance in familiar texts, or brings 
together apparently unrelated propositions in such a way as to suggest, strongly a 
coherent address to the problems posed. At all events, this is the method of ex­
position which I have adopted: to raise what seem to me problems and paradoxes in 
Epicurean atomism, to respond to them, as far as I can, using the intellectual 
apparatus of the ancient theory, and to indicate, where possible, how the texts 
support the reconstructions which I offer.
I. Collision
There are several words in the Epicurean texts which refer to the process of 
collision among atoms and the subsequent rebounds which are the exclusive form of 
interaction between the basic particles. In general, these terms are forms or com­
pounds of kope, krouo,. and pallo. The question I shall take up here is the nature 
of such collisions. We may begin by recalling Epicurus' conception of the nature 
of atomic motion; the following summary is from David Furley's fundamental essay, 
"Indivis ible Magnitudes."
Epicurus was unable to accept Aristotle's theory of 
continuity, because it involved the notion of potentiality 
and this was in conflict with his fundamental principles.
Like Leucippus and Democritus, therefore, he felt it 
necessary to accept the existence of indivisible magnitudes.
To avoid Aristotle's refutation, he postulated that his in­
divisibles should be minima— not points without magnitude, but 
units of minimum extension....
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Epicurus was now faced with further complications.
Aristotle had demonstrated that indivisible
magnitudes in motion require the assumption of. indivis i^·
ble units of space, time and motion, and, further, that
there can be no real difference of speed. Epicurus accepted
these conclusions, and worked out a theory of motion which
would incorporate these features and at the same time be consistent
with phenomena, (pp. 128-129) , · . ·.■
This theory, again in Furley's account, held that "one unit of motion involves 
traversing one unit of space in one unit
of time; and in this case (he agreed with Aristotle) it is never true to say
"it is moving" but only "it has moved" (p. 121). . .
The problem.is this: if Furley is right, and I believe he is, then, accord­
ing to Epicurus' theory there is no way in which two atoms can collide, or, what . 
amounts to the same thing, no way to define the difference between collision and 
mere continuity of atoms. For purposes of illustration, let us.imagine two cubical 
atoms, which we may represent in two dimensions as squares. Suppose that they are 
a distance o six minimum units of spase anart, and moving toward each other each 
at a speed of one minimum unit of space per.,minimum unit of time. If we represent 
the moment at which they are six minima apart as T(l), then clearly at T(2) they 
will be four minima apart, each atom having moved a distance of one minimum toward 
the other. At T(3) we shall find them separated by a distance of two minima,while 
at T(H) they wiil have traversed these last two units and so be up against one 
another. What happens at T(,5)? . Each atom is presumably inclined to advance another 
minimum unit in the direction it has until then been traveling. However, this is 
plainly impossible, since each represents an impenetrable obstacle for the other.
For them to continue to move as they had been, they will be obliged to overlap 
physically, and this would be inconsistent with Epicurus' conception of matter.
But neither is it the case that one or the other atom can shove its opposite number 
out of the way, thereby reversing the other's course and proceeding along its own. 
This is because, over a minimum interval, there is no moving, only a condition of 
having moved, which describes the position of an atom at any moment with respect 
to the moment before. Each atom is not only blocked from completing its motion 
across the subsequent interval, it is prevented even from beginning it,, because there 
is no beginning to such an interval, either in time or in space: there is nothing
smaller than a minimum. How, then, does either atom affect the subsequent motion 
of the other?
The same question may be put in a slightly different way. Imagine two atoms 
adjacent to each other, and moving at a uniform speed in the same direction. Their 
relative positions at T(l), T(2), etc., will be identical: with respect to one an­
other, they are not moving at all. Returning now to our earlier pair, which had 
beep moving toward each other, in. what way can they be said to differ at time T(*+), 
when they are side by side, from our latter pair at any of the moments T(l), T(2), 
and so on. Of course, we.can say that at the moment before their positions were 
different with respect to one another, but this fact will only be relevant if we 
can show that the condition of the pair of atoms at any preceding moment or moments 
is in some way necessary to a complete or adequate description of them at the 
moment T(U). We may note in. passing that Newtonian mechanics is not subject to 
this embarrassment because motion at an instant is defined as the limit of motion 
over a finite Interval. With the Epicurean theory, on the other hand, Zeno's 
paradox of.the arrow, which the atomists thought they had abolished, seems to have 
crept back in, :though in a different guise. True,, it now makes perfect sense to 
say that at any moment an atom is not moving (without .recourse to Aristotle's
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forraula that, at a given instant, a body is neither moving nor* not moving, since, 
for Epicurean minimalism, there are no Aristotelian instants), yet over successive 
instants it does move, or Ies moved. Instead, the problem becomes, what is it that 
distinguishes a moving atom at a given moment from a stationary one? If nothing, 
then why does the moving atom continue to move (or the stationary atom remain at 
rest)?
The answer, I believe, is given in the passage by David Furley quoted above: 
all atoms move always at a uniform speed. There are no stationary atoms. The two 
approaching atoms, once they are alongside each other, must change course (or at 
least one of them must), since they cannot proceed further in the direction they 
had been traveling, and they may not cease from motion. It is essential to take 
into account the previous history of an atom in describing it at any given moment,
because only in this way can we know whether and how it is moving with respect to
other bodies (or to some absolute point of reference). In any collisions, the
direction of this motion may change, but not its quantity. On this model, the
word "collision" seems inappropriate, although it does correspond well with the 
Greek terms krouo, "to knock," and kope, "a blow." "Deflection" is a better ex­
pression. An atom, simply by being there, prevents the progress of any other, 
which, since it must move, departs along some other trajectory.
We come now to the third stage of the argument: what evidence is there that
Epicurus was aware of this problem in his theory, or of its solution? We may begin 
by examining closely the text of Epicurus at the point where he first discusses 
atomic collisions (Letter to Herodotus ^3):
The atoms move continually throughout eternity, and 
while some of them separate from each other to a 
great distance, others maintain their vibration, when 
they happen to be supported by their entanglement or 
closed in by tangled atoms.
As always in Epicurus, there are problems with the text. In the first place,
Usener indicated a lacuna between z t  and A  explaining: "hiatum scholion 
intrusum procreavit. duplex enim motus distinguendus erat, is quo atomi pondere 
suo deorsum feruntur et is qui conlisione gignitur,^ qui nunc solus respicitur." 
Bignone and Bailey put the lacuna after M  ( y adding that
the doctrine of the swerve must also have been mentioned here. I see, however, 
no reason to assume that Epicurus must have introduced every kind of atomic motion 
in this paragraph. In the passage immediately preceding, the variety of percepti­
ble phenomena is explained by the various shapes of the atoms. Epicurus then 
turns, not to motion as such, but to motion in compound bodies. For this, we must 
know that the atoms are constantly moving: if they are not hindered, they will 
scatter widely, but if they are— and this is the main clause following the ! —
they will continue to oscillate as they did (reading with the MSS., not
■Xi C ö  Jor Λ θ' , suggested by Brieger and Usener respectively), since there 
will be nowhere else to go. Once we understand the connection between the necessary 
motion of the atoms and the process of collision or deflection, the sense of the 
passage as it stands is manifest.
Epicurus continues sec.
For the nature of the void which delimits.ehch atom provides’ this, 
since it is unable to offer the resistance; and the solidity which 
belongs to them makes the rebound in. the case of collision, to 
whatever distance the entanglement allows the separation from the 
collision.
The argument is straightforward. Atoms must move: if they meet no resistance,
they simply advance as they were going; if they do, they move off some other way.
We must beware of importing into ancient physics modern notions of billiard-ball 
mechanics, in which collisions involve transfer of energy or motion. There is no 
transfer in Epicurus' system; the source of motion is entirely within the individual 
atoms.
Let us consider the reasoning behind Epicurus' claim that all atoms constantly 
move, and move at the same speed. David Furley has shown most persuasively the 
dependence of this part of Epicurus' theory upon book Z of Aristotle's Physics. In 
a nutshell, Aristotle's argument is this. Partless entities must move in a jerk 
from one position to the next, or else they will be located at some moment partly 
in one place, partly in another, which contradicts the premise that they have no 
parts (po. 111-llU). He goes on to argue that if time is continuous, so is space.
The proof is to consider bodies moving at different speeds; in a shorter interval 
of time, the slower must traverse a smaller interval of space, and we may contract 
the intervals indefinitely (pp. 119-220). Furley concludes, then, that Epicurus 
"accepted Aristotle's contention that faster and sLower motion entails the divisibil­
ity of time and distance; he developed the theory that there are no real differences 
in the speeds of visible moving bodies" (p. 121). Did Epicurus have no other choice? 
Surely he did: he could have assumed that atoms may linger two or more temporal
minima in a given position before making the move to the next. Never, on this con­
ception, could an atom be caught part way across a spatial minimum, which is the 
heart of Aristotle's criticism. If Epicurus did not elect thiscption, it was per­
haps because there seemed to be no sufficient reason why an atom should take a 
longer or shorter time to,prepare its leap into another place.
But the real reason may be a simpler one: Epicurus admitted the uniform speed
of the atoms because it was an essential premise in his theory, not least of all in 
the account· of atomic deflections.
II. Contact · , ·.·
The reason why atoms deflect each other in collisions is. that they are im­
permeable (see section quoted above). · .■· In the punning ¡.phrase of Lucretius, 
officium quod corporis exstat officere (l. 336-7.), ‘How is this impenetrability 
accounted for? Taking the atomists as a group, four kinds of reasons rare indicated
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In addition, one must not imagine that there are infinitely many hits in a bounded 
body, even of indefinite size. So that not only must We eliminate division to 
infinity into ever smaller (parts), so that we do not make everything weak and, 
in our conceptions of aggregates, be compelled, to crush and squander existing 
things into nothing, but also one must not imagine that in bounded bodies there 
is a way to pass to the infinite even (by dividing) into (continuous but non­
vanishing) ever smaller (parts)/ Furley proposed taking the phrase toi horismenoi 
somati to mean the atom, and the onkoi, accordingly, as the parts of the atom. ’ 1 
Krämer has since restated quite forcefully the reasons why it is preferable to 
interpret somati as referring to any bounded body, and to understand onkoi in the 
usual sense of particles (Platonismus und hellenistischè Philosophie, pp. 237-239)» 
and there is no need to repeat them here. My point here is that the clause follow­
ing ou monon affirms the thesis which I labeled (a) above, while the clause 
following alia kai has reference to thesis (b). Thesis (a) is taken as already 
demonstrated, as indeed it was, rather summarily, in section 39· Thesis (b) is 
argued in the following paragraph (57), in the claim that an infinite number of 
parts, however minuscule, must sum to an infinite volume. Lucretius gives 
another argument for the proposition: if the atomic constituents of nature could
be infinitely small, then it would be impossible to conceive how they might ever 
recombine into coherent objects on the perceptible or macrocosmic scale.
I have' discussed in some detail the differences between Democritus’ and 
Epicurus’ treatment of the indivisibility of the atom because I wished to stress 
that in Epicurus’ theory, at least, the explanation of the impenetrability of 
the atom on the ground of the absence of void is in principle detachable from 
arguments concerning minima or partless entities. In the analysis presented in 
sections 56 and 57 of the Letter to Herodotus, it is, I think, assumed that matter 
free of void ië indivisible; the only thing at issue is, how small'are the units 
of pure matter in nature. The answer is, of course, they are of finitely small 
size. Now one problem we might offer Epicurus' theory is the possibility that 
atoms are hollow, in which case they might be said to contain void but neverthe­
less present a solid and impenetrable surface? I suppose that Epicurus excluded 
this possibility, though I do not know What kind of reasons he might have 
advanced. In any case, it is not an- important omission, so far as I can see. It ! 
is an entirely different matter, however, with the following difficulty. Imagine 
once more two atoms in the shape of boxes, placed alongside each other, face 
against face (as at the moment of collision discussed in section 1 above).
Between the ttto atoms there is no void. How then can they be separated, if indeed 
bodies can only be divided by cutting along thé space between them, solidity 
being nothing but the absence of this space? Before proceeding with this inquiry,
I had probably better pause to insist that' the issue is neither trivial nor a 
quibble, whether or not the Epicureans conceived of a satisfactory solution to 
this perplexity. Thus, it might be objected to the dilemma I have posed that 
Epicurus took as axiomatic the fact that atoms could not change in any way save 
in position and orientation. But the inalterability of the atoms was presented 
as a consequence of their solidity, not as an additional premise. Again and 
again we are told that the two fundamental principles (archai) of the Epicurean 
philosophy of nature are matter and the void, from which all other properties 
follow. The atoms are distinguished^precisely by-theλIntervening stretches of 
emptiness. Thus Epicurus speaks of A fh 0  \ 1 At- ·>
Q t. „ o{ ' j ¡ijV 1 ( the nature of the void dis-
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criminating each [atom]”) (sec. LV, Letter to Herod.) The testimony of 
Simplicius is unequivocal (in Arist. De Cáelo A7 (p. 109b39 Karst), Usener 28*0 : 
"For they [the atomists] said that the principles were infinite in number, and 
supposed that they were atomic and indivisible and impassive because they were 
compact and did not partake of void; they said that division occurred according 
to the void in bodies, but these atoms, being separated from one another in the 
infinite void and differing in shapes and sizes and position and order, raced inihe 
void, and, intercepting each other, they collide and some rebound wherever they 
chance to, while others are interwoven with each other...." Or Simplicius again 
on Arist. phys. D 6, (Usener 27*0: "They said in fact there was such an
interval, which, existing between bodies, does not permit the bodies to be 
continuous, as the followers of Leucippus and Democritus said...." Themistius' 
paraphrase' of the same passage makes the same point: "For these are the two 
types of arrangement of space, either that it is scattered among the bodies, as 
Democritus says and Leucippus and many others and finally Epicurus (for all 
these give the weaving in and about of void as the reason for the separation of 
bodies), or that it is separate and compact in itself, surrounding the 
heavens...." (again. Us. 27*0. Finally, a passage from Aetius (Usener 2 6 j ) :
"It was called an atom not because it is smallest, but because it cannot be 
cut, being impassive and without a share in void." I have quoted these 
representative citations in order to show that the Epicureans were at least 
aware that to explain imperviousness by the absence of void means also to define 
atoms by the fact that they are bounded by space rather than more matter. 
Continuous matter is indivisible, divisible matter is discontinuous. But when 
two atoms are in contact, they are no longer discontinuous; how is their 
boundary defined? To find an answer to this question, it is necessary, I 
believe, to re-examine once more the reasons why the Epicureans separated the 
issues of hardness and partlessness, in other words, to look again at the 
question of minimal parts. And that, of course, means Aristotle.
In his chapter, "Aristotle's Criticisms and Epicurus' Answers," David 
Furley demonstrates brilliantly how Epicurus' conceptions of atomic time and 
motion were responses to Aristotle's analysis of the doctrine of spatial minima. 
Further on, Furley observes: "But this still leaves it undecided why Epicurus
chose to make his minimum units of extension into parts of atoms, and not into 
the atoms themselves.... I have not been able to find any direct evidence on 
this question; but it is possible to make a reasonable guess. Aristotle's 
careful analysis of the geometry of motion made it clear that the distance 
traversed by amoving body must be composed of indivisible minima, if there are 
indivisible magnitudes at all. So he made it necessary for Epicurus to consider, 
not merely the atoms, but the places successively occupied by moving atoms. It 
must then have become obvious that the, units must all be equal (otherwise 
absurd consequences would follow, such as that an indivisible space was too 
small or too large for an indivisible atom to fit into it). But if this is so, 
then either all atoms must be equal in size, or else some atoms must occupy 
more than one unit of spatial extension. The first alternative, so Epicurus 
thought, did not square with the phenomena. So he adopted the second." (p. 129)
I leave aside the question of Democritus' conception of space; if it differed 
from Epicurus', it must have been fairly primitive, as Krämer makes clear 
(p. 277). On the issue of parts, however, there is, unless I am mistaken, an 
oversight in Furley's argument. For to prove that "some atoms must occupy more 
than one unit of spatial extension" does not entail that no_ atoms may be 
exactly one minimum in magnitude. But it is just this latter, stronger 
proposition which we need to demonstrate. This is not a casual distinction.
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For just as the essential difference "between Democritus and Epicurus on the 
nature of the atom is that, for the latter, the atom had parts, so the 
essential difference between them on the nature of minimal or partless entities 
is that, for Epicurus, they could never subsist independently, but must always 
exist only as parts of larger bodies. Lucretius’ phrase, minimae partes, is in 
no way redundant: they are not simply partless, they are less than wholes, and 
thus inseparable in fact or in thought from the atoms they compose. Our 
question, then, is, why did Epicurus add this feature to the definition of the 
minima?
The answer, I believe, is to be found, not in Aristotle's analysis of 
motion, but rather in his analysis of contact and continuity in the opening 
paragraph of book Z of the Physics. The passage reads as follows: "If there is
continuity and contact and consecutiveness, as was defined above that continuous 
things have their boundaries in common, touching things have them together, 
and consecutive things have nothing of the same sort between— then it is 
impossible for continuity to be composed of indivisibles, for example the line 
out of points, if indeed the line is a continuous thing, and the point is 
indivisible. For neither are the boundaries of points in common (hen) (for of 
the indivisible there is not both a boundary and some other part), nor are the 
boundaries together (for there is no boundary at all of the partless thing; 
for the boundary is a different thing from that of which it is the boundary). 
Moreover, it is necessary that the points be either continuous or touching each 
other, for a continuous thing to be composed of them; and the same argument 
applies also to all indivisibles. They would not be continuous according to 
the argument just stated. For everything touches either whole to whole or part 
to part or part to whole. And, since the indivisible is partless, it is 
necessary that it touch whole to whole. But whole touching whole will not be 
continuous. For the continuous has one part here and another there, and is 
divided into parts that differ in this way and are separated in place. But 
neither will point be consecutive upon point, nor instantaneous moment upon 
moment, so that magnitude or time can be composed from these. For consecutive 
means that there is nothing of the same sort between them, but there is always 
line between points and time between moments. Furthermore, there would be 
division into indivisibles, if indeed each (i.e. time and the line) were divided 
into these things of which they are composed; but no continuities were supposed 
to be divisible into partless things. And there cannot be another type of thing 
between. So it will either be indivisible or divisible, and if divisible, either 
into indivisibles or into forever divisibles; and this is the continuous.
Clearly, then, every continuity is divisible into forever divisibles; for if 
into indivisibles, it will be indivisible touching indivisible; for the boundary 
of continuous things is in common and touches."
In brief, Aristotle's argument is this: a continuous magnitude cannot be
composed of discrete, consecutive elements, because the discreteness violates 
the very meaning of continuity, that any two distinct points bound a segment 
of the continuum. On the other hand, it cannot be composed of either continuous 
or touching partless elements, because partless elements cannot be either 
continuous or in contact; the reason here is that continuity and contact are 
defined as relations between boundaries, and partless things cannot have 
boundaries distinct from some remaining portion. Now, it is very important to 
be clear about what Aristotle does and does not say here. He does not argue, 
for example, that points are .not part of a line. Quite the ·contrary, the point 
is the boundary of the line, and Aristotle is explicit that the boundary is a
-Si-
part of the whole (objects touching part to part touch precisely at their 
boundaries). However, these parts cannot be construed as a collection of free­
standing entities arranged side to side, simply because they have no sides. That 
is, the partless entity has no independent existence, but subsists only as a 
part (cf. De anima U31bl5-1T:"so one thinks of mathematical entities, which are 
not separated, as though they were separated, whenever one thinks of them").
, Simplicius, in his commentary on this passage in the Physics (Usener 268), 
suggested (cf.-|.crwWS) that Aristotle’s argument here was directed against the 
early atomists, and that Epicurus, in sympathy with the Democritean conceptions 
but daunted by the force of Aristotle’s logic, abandoned partlessness as a cause 
of the atom's indivisibility, though he preserved Democritus' other, premise, 
that of impassivity (apatheia) as the reason for this quality of matter. But 
how, in fact, would Aristotle's reasoning have told against Democritus’ theory?
If Democritean atoms were true minima, and if indeed he did not think it necessary 
to posit a granulan conception of space as well, as modern analysts seem to 
agree, then in the Democritean system there were no physical continua, and 
therefore there was nothing for Aristotle's critique to challenge. But if we 
look, not to Aristotle's conclusion, but to the first stage or lemma of his 
theorem, we may, I think, discover the issue that troubled Epicurus. Aristotle 
seemed to have shown that Democritus' atoms, being partless, could not touch 
each other except as whole to whole, which is to say, by overlapping— which 
contradicted the principle of atomic impermeability. And Epicurus found the 
solution to this problem, here as often elsewhere, by accommodating his 
materialist analysis entirely to Aristotle's requirements.
Epicurus, then, abandoned the notion of a self-subsisting minimum entity. 
Every actual body, accordingly, has parts, and among these parts may be 
included all surfaces, edges and corners. Thus, the Epicurean atoms answer to 
all the conditions imposed by Aristotle's definitions of continuity and 
contiguity. Moreover, with the stipulation of minimum parts, Epicurus' atoms 
are impervious to Aristotle's whole argument for infinite divisibility in the 
passage cited. The only (but crucial) difference is that the extreme or limit 
is assumed to be an inconceivably small but nevertheless finite quantity, while 
for Aristotle the boundary is of zero magnitude in at least one dimension.
David Furley, however, has charged Epicurus with one departure from 
Aristotle's analysis, a departure so serious as to suggest that Epicurus 
altogether abandoned the line of reasoning which Aristotle had developed. In 
section 58 of the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus is speaking of minimum parts 
in perceptible objects: "We examine these beginning from the first and not in
the same (spot), nor touching parts to parts, but in their own nature as things 
that measure sizes, more of them measuring a greater thing and fewer of them a 
lesser." Furley remarks on this sentence (p. 115): "Here Epicurus answers 
Aristotle with an echo of his own words. These indivisible units are ranged 
in order in the continuum, and their' contact is neither of whole with whole 
(i.e. 'within the same area') nor of part with part." Furley goes on to observe: 
"But Aristotle said that contacts must be either of whole with whole or of part 
with part or of part with whole. Epicurus clearly envisages another possibility 
altogether. His indivisibles, he explains, are to be units of measure: that is
to say, they are to have extension." If, of course, Epicurus was simply 
unimpressed by Aristotle's analysis, and dismissed it casually with the suggestion 
that there was some Other way in which partless entities may be arranged in a 
continuum, then the argument which I have been developing must collapse. To see
- 10-
that this is not the case, we may put the following question to Aristotle's 
theory: given that an extremity is part of a whole, how is it attached? The
extremity itself has no parts, else there would be an infinite regression, each 
boundary defined by a further boundary. Thus, the extremity can not be continuous 
or contiguous with the remaining substance; nor, clearly, will it do to suppose 
it divided from it by a stretch of some other kind of matter. The answer to 
this conundrum is that we are not required to explain the connection between body 
and surface in the same way we must account for the contact between two discrete 
bodies, because a surface can only be understood as a pant; it is not and cannot 
be discrete; because we cannot conceive of it as a discrete element, there is no 
sense ;in inquiring how it might abut another object. Similarly, Epicurus was not 
obliged to indicate how his minima, which were likewise inconceivable except as 
parts, were arranged in the larger mass; it was sufficient to say that they did 
not touch part to part, nor did they overlap. Furley goes on to argue that by 
identifying the extremity with the indivisible part, the Epicureans "were then 
left without a word for the edges of the indivisible part; but the existence of 
its edges was a necessary consequence of their theory...." (p. Il6) I can only 
say that the Epicureans did not, I am sure, believe that the minimum quantity 
had edges; else there was nothing to prevent its independent existence. Nor is 
there a hint in the texts of such a doctrine. Furthermore, Furlëy's suggëstion 
that they "could have pointed out that the extremity is not a part," would not 
have commended itself to the Epicureans. Gould it have worked for the minimum, 
it would have done for the atom too. I suspect that the notion of a boundary 
that was neither a part of matter nor physically separable from it would have 
smacked too much of idealism for Epicurus' comfort.
I have been arguing that the chief reason why Epicurus defined his minima 
as always and essentially participating in some larger extended bit of matter 
was to solve the problem of contact among atoms, which is equivalent to the 
problem of boundary. I believe that a passage in the Letter to Herodotus tends 
to corroborate this point* if we read it correctly. Reasoning from the observa­
tion that sensible objects have: perceptible but partless extremes, Epicurus
_ Λ Λ . _____-,____  _ , _______ », i _ _  . . , . ~ _______ ._______  J' _  X
"further, it is necessary to think of the minimum and partless entities as the 
limits (or boundaries) of extended masses, providing of themselves the primary 
measure for greater and smaller things in the rational theory concerning 
invisible things." (Text as in Furley and Krämer, except that I have preserved 
the MSS proton for proton.) My translation of the phrase 
follows Bailey and Krämer, but differs from Furley's version, which reads: 
"Further, we must take these minimum pärtless limits as providing the larger and 
smaller things...;" that is, Furley takes elachista and!amere as adjectives 
modifying the substantive perata, which serves as the subject'of paraskeuazonta 
(a participial construction with nomizo, for which Furley gives a parallel in 
Letter to Herod..7U.3). Bailey's interpretation is,Furley contends, unnecessary, 
and "makes poor sense, because we do not need at this stage to be told that the 
minima are limits or extremities": (p. 26), since this information had already 
been provide^ in sec. 57·
• li'
The passage is textually problematic, and its significance, moreover, depends 
in part on whether we agree with Furley that the reference is restricted to atoms 
and minima, or with Krämer and others that it embraces all bounded bodies (see 
above, pp. j" (r>). Either way, however, it is not the case that Epicurus has 
already averred that the minima constitute boundaries; all that he has done is to 
assume that boundaries are not of no size, and that if bodies are composed of 
boundary-like parts, then an infinite number of them must generate a mass of 
infinite size.
Krämer, as I have indicated, keeps the phrase as a unit
(pp. 2U7-2U8), but would understand the term perata not as boundary but as limit 
in size, i.e. smallest magnitude: ’’Das gleiche gilt für den Ausdruck TCéy-'
womit nicht etwa 'Grenzen' im Sinne von 'äussersten Gliedern,’ sondern Grenz- und 
Grundwerte der Ausdehnung, d. h. letzte Elemente der (linearen) Erstreckung 
(T* V  j' ‘ \ gemeint sind, die nicht weiter teilbar sind und so eine letzte
Teilungs ’grenze’ setzen" (p. 2U7 ; so too von Arnim, Bignone, and Bailey). But 
this not only renders the passage redundant, it also ignores the feature of 
Epicurus' thinking for which section 57 does give evidence, that the concept of 
the minimum part is acquired through extrapolation from the notion of an extreme 
border, whether a surface, edge or comer. For it is only at the boundary that 
we can actually grasp, whether visually or intellectually, the minimum quantity 
as a percept or idea, though at the same time there is no way to conceive Of it 
apart from the substance it delimits. According to Epicurean theory, our 
experience of minima is as boundaries. Of course, minima serve several purposes 
in the system, such as units of measure (kat ametremat a) and ¿s the basis of the 
atomistic reply to the Eleatic paradoxes. But that the minimum could not subsist 
independently occurred to Epicurus not in those contexts, but in the investigation 
of atomic boundaries.
In the sentence following the one we have been analyzing, Epicurus concludes 
his argument. I borrow Furley's translation, and also his emendation of ta 
ametabola to ta_ metabola: "For the similarity between them and changeable things
is sufficient to establish so much; but it is impossible that there should ever 
be a process of composition out of these minima having motion." (p. 25) Why is 
this process impossible? Wot because minima would be incapable of motion, since, 
as we have seen, the only argument Aristotle levelled at this (presumably) 
Democritean conception of the atom was that it entailed the minimalization of 
space and time, and this Epicurus accepted. I suggest that the impossibility 
resides in the symphoresis, the coming together, and that the reasons are precisely 
Aristotle's: free-standing partless bodies cannot meet, because they are without
surfaces.
I shall conclude vay discussion of the present topic with a question to 
Eïpicurus' theory (as I have reconstructed it) : does the analysis of atomic
boundaries in terms of minimum parts account satisfactorily for the discreteness 
of adjacent atoms? On the whole, it would seem so. The surface of a particle 
is inseparable from and inconceivable without the rest. It can only be part of 
that to which it has always belonged. To put it another way, the relationship 
among minimum parts in an atom is fundamentally different from the relationship
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among atoms; the former constitute continuous matter, while the latter, precisely 
in that they have the distinct surfaces which minima lack, can he brought into 
contact but cannot merge into a common corpuscle. We must concede, however, 
that the argument for the indivisibility of matter can no longer rest solely 
on the absence of void. That formulation will have to be regarded as part of the 
heritage of Democritus, which continues to be valid for Epicurus only in the 
sense that there is no void internal to an atom; atomic boundaries,however, are 
defined by the principles explicated above. And we may add, indeed, that without 
the additional postulate of minimum parts, there is no way that Epicurus could 
have solved the problem of continguity and discreteness. For without a deep 
structure to matter, it differs from space only as its complement. It is a 
purely geometrical conception: we may picture a plane of dark shapes against a
light background; adjacent and continuous forms cannot be distinguished. With 
the Aristotelian concept of boundary, made physical by endowing it with actual 
if minimal extension in all dimensions, Epicurus drew the line that divided 
contiguous substance.
We know, from Diogenes Laertius' life of Epicurus (,10.28), that Epi.curus t 
wrote two books entitled, On the Corner in the Atom *V% 'f'*'**)
and On Contact C \ i  p i v V ~. , ). is it too presumptuous to suggest that in* these 
volumes Epicurus may have taken up in greater detail some of the arguments 
concerning boundaries and contact which I have considered here?
III. Weight
Plutarch, in The Opinions of the Philosophers, tells us: "these bodies
(i.e., atoms) have the following three.attributes, shape, size and weight. 
Democritus, indeed, mentioned two, size and shape; but Epicurus added weight 
to these as a third" (Us. 275 ; DK 68 A 1+7, cited as Aetius). There is no doubt, 
of course, about Epicurus' position, but in the case of Democritus there is room 
for considerable controversy. On the one hand, there are several other 
testimonies to the effect that Democritus did not acknowledge weight as one of 
the fundamental features of atoms [citations in DK U7; by implication also else­
where, as in Aristotle Physics A 5 l88a22 (DK U5): "Democritus says that there
is the solid and void, of which the one is as being, the other as not being; 
further by position, shape and order"— no mention of weight; so also Cicero,
De nat.deor. 1.26.73 (DK 5l) » De, fin. 1.6.17 (DK 56)]. On the other hand, 
Aristotle states explicitly that in the case of atoms, Democritus held that 
weight varies directly with size, a relationship which does not hold for compound 
bodies because they contain greater or lesser quantities of void (Arist. De gen, 
et corr. A 8 326a9; De cáelo D 2 309al, cit. DK 60). Moreover, Democritus 
certainly provided an account of the phenomenon of weight, of bodies relatively 
lighter and heavier, in the perceptible world. How is the conflicting evidence 
of our sources to be reconciled? David Furley, in a recent investigation of the 
atomists' theory of motion ("Aristotle and the Atomists on Motion in a Void," 
in P.K. Machamer and R.J. Turnbull, edd., Motion and Time, Space and Matter, 
Columbus, Ohio, 1976), describes the current consensus as follows: "Faced with
this contradiction, modern interpreters have propounded a clever solution. So 
long as atoms are not involved in a cosmic vortex, they are weightless, and 
collision is the only factor that explains their motion. The vortex, however, 
drives larger atoms to the center, and this tendency to move toward the center 
is what 'weight' means. So, he adds wrily, "this cake can be had and eaten"
(p. 86). As will shortly become clear, I do not myself believe that the notion 
of atomic weight functions in quite this way in the Democritean system, but 
before addressing this issue, and its implications for Epicurus' concept of
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weight, in greater detail, I must pause to consider Furley's claim, advanced in 
this same paper, that the vortex played no rolé at all in Democritus’ account of 
why things fall. Furley puts forward two objections to the modern solution. The 
first is that vortices do not have a punctual center: "the center of a vortex
is a line, not a point, and although it may account for the motion of bodies 
towards the central axis, it does not yield an explanation of why bodies should 
congregate at the midpoint of the central axis...." (p. 8j). I believe that
Furley is in error here. Vortices do indeed have an axis; this they have in 
common with the mere centrifugal rotation of a column of fluid. But vortices 
also have a vertical vector, which is much in evidence in the action of a 
tornado or maelstrom. In fact, the centripetal force in the vortex is inseparable 
from the vertical motion at the axis, for the mechanics of the vortex are based 
on a drag effect, in which the speed of rotation, and therefore the centrifugal
force, at one end of the column is less than that at the other. The result of
this differential is a rotary flow along the axis of the funnel, with
dispersion of the fluid at one end and a pressure toward the axis at the other.
The following diagram illustrates both the horizontal and the vertical flow
Moreover, since a vortex necessarily occur in a medium, the effects of floating 
and sinking, that is, of differential densities, will also play a part in the 
distribution of any particles within the swirl. Light particles may, for 
example, be scattered at the top of the column, while heavy ones are concentrated 
at the bottom; objects of the appropriate density and shape (flat and wide, say) 
may even float suspended for a while at some point along the axial center. (I am 
indebted for this description of the dynamics of the vortex to Steven Tigner, who 
summarized the basic principles in his article, "Empedocles' Twirled Ladle and 
the Vortex-Supported Earth," Isis 65 (197*0 ^ 0  (cited by Furley, p. 98, note 9)· 
Tigner gave a much fuller account in an unpublished paper, "Vortex Action in Pre- 
Platonic Cosmology," in which he took as a point of departure Albert Einstein's 
"admirably brief and lucid explanation" of one kind of vortex in "The Cause of 
the Formation of Meanders in the Courses of Rivers and of the So-called Beer's 
Law," Essays in Science New York, 193^, p. 86.) Thus the vortex is a fairly 
complex system, and can provide a model for several different physical phenomena, 
including dispersal and congregation of particles, suspension at different levels 
along the axis, and vertical motion either upward or downward in the axial 
vacuum. In a cosmological theory, it could serve quite nicely as an explanation 
both for the differential distribution of substances varying in size, shape and 
density, and also for a downward tendency in particles at or near the axis of 
the whirlpool. We do not have the evidence, so far as I know, to reconstruct 
even the broad outlines of Democritus' theory concerning this process, but it is 
easy to imagine how a constant atomic rain could be invoked to explain why heavy 
objects are disposed to fall, or, when hurled upward, to slow down and ultimately 
reverse their course under such an imperceptible but massive bombardment.
-1U-
[Could i this "be the sense of Cic. De fato 20. U6, where Dem's plaga is equated-with 
fipjs gravitas and pondus? Cit Us. 28l)
Furley’s second objection to the vortex theory is that "the Aristotelian view 
of weight as a tendency to move toward the midpoint of the cosmic sphere entails 
that the earth itself is spherical..., but Democritus believed the earth to be 
flat...” (p. 87)· Here too, a clearer conception of the operation of the vortex 
provides us with a different image. An object caught at the bottom of an eddy is 
more likely to have the shape of a disk or drum; or perhaps we ought to imagine 
it resting like a metal plate on updrafts from below (cf. Aristotle, De cáelo 
cf. Poe’s ’’Maelstrom" D 6 313a21ff., cit DK 68 A 62). However this may be, I 
cannot agree with Furley that "the vortex seems totally inadequate to explain 
weight," and therefore I do not feel "forced back on the interpretation that 
weight, meaning a tendency to fall vertically, is a primary, irreducible property 
of the atoms." I continue to believe that it was an innovation of Epicurus to 
include weight in this sense among the fundamental attributes of the atom.
Before leaving Democritus’ theory, however, we must examine one consequence 
of endorsing the role of the vortex: if the tendency of objects to fall— that is,
the terrestrial effect of gravity— is to be ascribed to the action of the cosmic 
swirl, then what function is left to the category of weight in this system? I 
do not believe it is the case, as some have suggested, that weight is merely a 
redundant expression for a gravitational effect that is entirely reducible to the 
vortical mechanism. It is worth recalling that for the ancient philosophers in 
general, and above all for the presocratics, the phenomenon to be explained was 
not, in the first instance, the disposition of matter to fall; rather, it was 
the twin tendencies of some objects to sink and others to rise. Aristotle 
attacked this issue with the doctrine of natural places. The atomists, though 
not they alone, had recourse to a theory of displacement or extrusion, ekthlipsis 
in Greek, according to which heavier or denser objects had the capacity to drive 
lighter ones out and upward. The fact that air bubbles rise in water, or tongues 
of flame in air, was explained not in terms of the natural motion of the rarer 
elements, but as an effect caused by the superior downward thrust of the particles 
constituting the heavier medium. We have explicit testimony in Simplicius that 
Democritus, like Epicurus, posited this effect (on De cáelo, cit. DK 6l; the 
supposition in DK that Epicurus' position differed substantially from Democritus' 
because Epicurus ascribed uniform speed to the atoms seems unwarranted, since it 
is not clear that the relative velocity of the atoms has anything to do with the 
process of extrusion). Now, I submit that this power of atoms to jostle their 
lighter neighbors out of' the way was precisely the property to which Democritus 
attached the name weight. Wé may observe that weight In this sense has nothing 
whatever to do with tendency of atoms or compound bodies to fall; whenever a 
group of atoms is moving, for whatever reason, in a uniform direction, and. 
encounters a resisting surface or texture of corpuscles, the heavier, if they 
are atoms, or the denser, if they are compounds, will force their way further 
in the given line of progress and displace the lighter. To be sure, this process 
will only yield the regular contrariety of direction exhibited in the perceived 
motion of lighter and heavier substances when the random atomic movements are 
organized into a more or less uniform current, and such a current was assumed by 
Democritus' to arise out of chance turbulences evolving into vortices. That is, 
the vortex is a necessary condition of the observed phenomena of displacement.
But, in the first place, the vortex is not a sufficient condition: it must be
supplemented by the power associated with weight. And, in the second place— but 
no less important— weight is not even a necessary condition for the formation of
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the vortex and the tendency of matter to fall. Against the hypothesis that 
Democritus saw any connection between weight and some priviledged direction in 
the universe, I may add that I see no reason at all to suppose that, according 
to his theory, the vórtices in different cosmoi necessarily had the same orienta­
tion.
Why did Democritus not elevate weight to the rank of one of the primary 
qualities of the atom, along with size and shape? Perhaps it was because weight' 
was, for Democritus, simply a function of size (Arist. De gen, et corr. A 8 326a9; 
De cáelo D 2 309al, cit. DK 6o), which was certainly not the case for Epicurus. 
More likely, though, is the fact that weight could only manifest itself as a 
relation among atoms and under certain specified conditions; a single atom, 
considered in isolation, would present itself only as a geometric form. If this 
is so, then we can see that, at least with respect to the atomists, there was some 
justice in Aristotle's claim that his predecessors had not accounted for weight 
as such, but only for the heavier and the lighter (Arist. De cáelo D. 1. 3θ8 all). 
[Furley, p. 96, uses this remark to a different effect.] In the Democritean 
conception, it does not make sense to speak of the weight of an atom as such, but 
only with respect to other atoms heavier or lighter than itself.
In the physical theory of Epicurus, the role of ecthlipsis is every bit as 
important as it was for Democritus, if not more so. The pseudo-Plutarchan 
treatise On the Opinions of the Philosophers preserves a fairly detailed account 
of the distribution of the elements during the creation of the cosmos based 
entirely on the operation of this principle (Usener 308), and Simplicius too, as 
I have indicated above, makes clear the connection between weight and displacement 
in Epicurus* system (the passages from his commentary on De cáelo are quoted in 
Usener 276). Plainly, the Democritean concept of weight, that heavier, which is 
to say larger, atoms have the capacity to displace smaller and lighter ones, is 
essential also to Epicurus' view, and there can be little doubt that he simply 
adopted this function along with the doctrine of extrusion. Epicurus' own 
contribution was to make the category of weight serve a second purpose as well, 
that of accounting for the uni form flow of the atoms, without which, as we have 
seen, it was impossible to explain the phenomena of sinking and floating. For 
reasons that are still somewhat obscure to me, the vortex fell out of favor as a 
paradigm of the cosmological process in the time of Plato and Aristotle. I 
suspect that the vortex came to be considered a complex motion, which itself 
demanded an explanation in terms of simpler forces such as linear and rotary 
translation; in the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanica, for example, the action of a 
vortex in collecting particles at the center (meson) is presented as a problem, 
and the solution is given in terms of circular motions (Problem 35» 858b 3 ff.). 
Epicurus, at any rate, abandoned it as a cause of gravitational phenomena, and 
posited in its place an inherent disposition of the atom to move in a single 
privileged direction. Such an assumption was undoubtedly facilitated by the 
doctrines of natural motion propounded by Plato and Aristotle, despite the great 
differences between the theories. In any case, Epicurus was also responsible, 
again, I am sure, under the influence of Aristotle, for assigning the name of 
weight to this power. At first sight, this appears to be a perfectly reasonable 
move, but I must again emphasize that in fact two quite different concepts of 
functions are cohabiting under the cover of a single term in the Epicurean 
interpretation. We are apt to overlook this fact because in the modern,
Newtonian analysis of gravitational attraction the force varies directly with 
the mass of the bodies involved, and hence the same formula that defines the 
attraction also accounts for its greater magnitude in the case of heavier
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substances . There is no such relationship in the ancient system. As a property 
of the atom in itself--that third characteristic which Epicurus posited in 
addition to the Democritean two— weight is only the tendency of atoms to move 
down in preference to some other direction (I shall indicate shortly how I 
understand this law to work). All atoms do this at a uniform speed, smaller and 
larger ones exhibiting no distinctions in this respect. Thus, if we look only 
to this feature, it cannot be said that weight implies any notion of heavier 
and lighter; it is an absolute property, not admitting of gradations. In the 
theory of extrusion, on the other hand, weight is a function of the size of the 
atom, and remains, as it was with Democritus, essentially a relative concept 
(cf. Letter to Herod, sec. 6l).
It is worth noting that, as an explanation of the observed 'phenomena of 
terrestrial gravitation, the Epicurean notion of atomic weight is not an obvious 
candidate. To say that all atoms fall uniformly downward does not explain why 
solid and liquid masses plummet to the earth, since the earth itself should, on 
this reasoning, be sinking as fast as any other body. The Epicurean explanation 
was that the earth's downward course is retarded by the resistance of a 
relatively thick or viscous atomic medium which surrounds it; the smaller, 
narrower objects on its surface more easily penetrate this fluid, which on the 
upper side of the disk may be recognized as the atmosphere. In this account, 
however, it seems to me that the Epicurean principle of isotacheia or uniform 
atomic velocity is a necessary premise, since it explains why the relatively 
compact aggregate of atoms that constitutes a cosmos must fall more slowly than 
free particles: collisions introduce a horizontal component to the atomic motions
which reduces in a proportional degree the vertical or downward speed. I do not, 
however, know of any evidence that the Epicureans actually thought the problem 
through in this way.
I have argued that the Epicurean conception of weight may be understood as 
a disposition of the atoms to move in a privileged direction, which is defined 
as down. (Strictly speaking, I ought to discriminate between the two senses of 
weight in Epicurus' theory, employing some such convention as weightgfor the 
gravitational property, and weighi^ for the feature relevant to extrusion or 
ecthlipsis; but in all that follows I shall be concerned only with the former 
quality, that is to say, with Epicurus' distinctive contribution.) Furley puts 
it well when he writes: "Epicurus defended and revised the Atomist theory of
motion by introducing something like the concept of a vector" (Aristotle and 
the Atomists...," p. 96; cf. also my article, "Epicurus on 'Up' and 'Down' (Letter 
to Herodotus sec. βθ)", Phronesis IT (1972) 269-278, esp. pp. But how
did the Epicureans imagine this process to occur in the case of individual atoms? 
David Furley, commenting on section 6l of the Letter to Herodotus, explains it 
as follows:
Two kinds of motion are mentioned here: motion downward, which is
due to weight, and motion upward or sideways, which is due to 
collision. The last sentence of this passage may need explanation.
Epicurus says that motion due to either one of these causes will 
go on at the same speed until it is countered. If it is downward 
motion, it can only be countered by collision with another atom 
coming up or across; if it is upward or sideways motion, it can 
be countered by collision or by the reassertion of weight. In the 
latter case one would expect a slow deceleration, followed by 
acceleration in another direction, but this is ruled out.
-±Y-
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I translate: "But Epicurus added weight as a third to these; for he said it is
necessary that bodies move by means of the blow of the weight, since they will 
not be moved [sc. by some other force or agency]." Now, for the word plegei, 
"blow," Usener substituted holkei, "attraction" or "pull." This is consistent 
with his emendation of the Letter to Herodotus. But the manuscript reading points 
once again, albeit in an abbreviated and confused way, to a connection between 
weight and collision.
I submit that for Epicurus, all changes in the direction of atomic motion, 
including those which result in a downward course and occur under the influence 
of atomic weight, are consequences of atomic collisions. I suggest accordingly 
that we interpret the gravitational property of atoms as a tendency to emerge 
from collisions in a preferred direction, a direction which is, by definition, 
down. Once more, it is important to be wary of carrying modern notions over into 
the analysis of ancient mechanics. I know of no evidence in Epicurus that even 
hints at a rule such as the conservation of momentum, which would entail that 
the direction of atomic rebounds bear some lawful relation to the shape of the 
particles and their direction of motion preceding the impact. There are no 
propositions to the effect, for example, that an equality between the angle of 
incidence and the angle of reflection governs the ricochet of atomic projectiles. 
In the first section of this paper I argued that atomic collisions in the 
Epicurean system axe in fact rather deflections, that atoms blocked from pro­
ceeding in a given course by the presence of an opposing particle and tinder the 
necessity of maintaining an unvarying velocity simply take off in another 
direction. There is nothing, however, to indicate that this is a determinate 
direction. Nothing, that is, except the principle that I am now advancing, that 
the motion of an atom following a collision is most likely to be downward. The 
cause of this disposition is, I believe, what Epicurus called weight.
Is Epicurus’ conception of weight a coherent one? Critics from antiquity 
down through the present have heaped scorn upon Epicurus for supposing that in an 
infinite homogeneous space (that is, with no global anomalies in the distribution 
of atoms), one could rationally define the directions up and down. Consider the 
view of Felix Cleve, in The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy, who writes: 
"Adopting Democritean atomism without real understanding and out of ulterior 
motives that have nothing to do with any genuine interest in natural philosophy, 
Epicurus just bowdlerizes the theories of Democritus." As a case in point, Cleve 
cites "Epicurus’ assumption of atoms of different sizes that are ’falling* with 
equal velocity parallel ’downwards’ (when there is not yet an earth, even.’)..." 
(vol. 2, p. klU). While the tone is perhaps more vituperative than is customary 
in contemporary criticism, the point which Cleve makes is commonplace. Even so 
excellent a student of Epicurean physics as Jürgen Mau could say: "Im
unendlichen Raum gibt es kein absolute Oben und Unten, demnach auch keine Mitte" 
("Raum und Bewegung: Zu Eîpikurs Brief an Herodot sec. 60," Hermes 82 (195*0 20).
I must insist that this kind of objection to Epicurus' doctrine of weight and 
cosmic orientation is really quite vacuous. Of course there is no top and bottom 
to an infinite universe. But the hypothesis that atoms-tend to rebound
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preponderantly in a single direction, or even that they merely favor one direction 
slightly more than others, affords a perfectly rigorous and intelligible 
definition of a vertical orientation in spane. The issue is entirely analogous 
to the modern theory of a distinction in nature between left and right (the 
abolition of parity): the spin of particles emerging from certain reactions does
not exhibit the expected symmetry, but rather a statistical preference for one 
direction over the other. The theory may of course be wrong, due to faulty 
measurements or invisible factors; but it is not nonsense. (Cf. "Epicurus on 'Up' 
and 'Down'..., p. 277). Similarly with Epicurus' doctrine: whatever its faults
or virtues as an explanation of the phenomena of gravity and displacement, 
there is no problem whatsoever concerning the logical status of his fundamental 
premise of a directional vector in the universe determined by the preferential 
course of weighted atoms.
There is a difficulty, however, with thé notion of absolute space, with 
respect to which all atoms are said to be in motion. In an unbounded universe, 
we are free to choose our frame of reference. There is no reason, for example, 
why we cannot imagine ourselves moving along with a freefalling atom; with 
respect to the coordinate system in which such an atom served as the origin, all 
atoms descending under the influence of weight would appear stationary, while 
rising atoms would appear to be ascending with twice the velocity that Epicurus 
assigns them. On this matter, two things may be said. In the first place, I 
have no doubt that Epicurus believed intuitively in an absolute frame of 
reference, a fixed spatial grid, in terms of which falling atoms could be said 
to have real motion, and no atoms could be said to be at rest. This is not 
surprising. As Arnold Koslow has shown, Newton too held such a view, and it has 
persisted into this century. Koslow quotes H. Feigl, "The Origin and Spirit of 
Logical Positivism," (in P. Achinstein and S. Barker, edd., The Legacy of Logical 
Positivism, Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Baltimore,' I969, P · 7) "Once
(in I92O) I heard a disciple of Franz Brentano's— Oskar Kraus at the University 
of Prague— debate Einstein with great excitement. He maintained that the 
following was a synthetic a priori truth: 'If two bodies move relatively to each
other, then at least one of them moves with respect to absolute space."' Feigl 
goes on to remark that "this illustrates beautifully the intrusion of the 
pictorial appeal of the Platonic 'receptacle' notion of space or a confusion of 
a purely definitional truth (regarding three coordinate systems) with genuinely 
factual and empirically testable statements regarding the motion of bodies" 
(Koslow, "Ontological and Ideological Issues of the Classical Theory of Space 
and Time," in Matter, Time Motion and Space p. ). I may remark that the 
critique of the notion of absolute rest and motion is quite independent of 
relativity theory, although relativity theory is in fact incompatible, with such 
an assumption. The second point is that the relativity of frames of reference 
introduces no practical difficulty into Epicurus' system. One may be tempted 
to suppose, for instance, that in the absence of a fixed frame, it makes no 
sense to speak of atoms having uniform velocity, since, as we have seen, we may 
select another set of coordinates, in motion with respect to the first, in terms 
of which such a statement will be false. However, provided we do not contemplate 
a relativistic geometry, it suffices to assert that there exists some frame of 
reference in which all atoms are moving at uniform speed; we may call this the 
absolute frame. Naturally, I do not mean to imply that Epicurus contemplated 
such a view. I wish only to indicate that, contrary to opinions of some 
impressive scholars, there is nothing incoherent or inconsistent in Epicurus' 
postulates concerning weight and motion in infinite space.
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A literal translation: "And in fact the all is infinite both in the quantity of
the bodies and in the size of the void." Also infinite, in the Epicurean system, 
are, a fortiori, all phenomena or events in which atoms participate, e.g. the 
number of cosmoi (section 1+5)· Time has no beginning and no end, but I am not 
sure that Ifcicurus would have called it "infinitely extended" (D.J. Furley, 
"Aristotle and the Atomists on Infinity," in Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles 
und Theophrast (Heidelberg, 1969) 85), since I am inclined to doubt that he 
conceived of time as a dimension. The text is chapters 72-73 of the Letter to 
Herodotus, but I reserve discussion of this problem for another occasion.. Here 
I should like toscall attention to another class of phenomena which, while 
they are not infinite in number, are described as being incalculably or 
inconceivably large. The clearest instance of this class is the variety of 
atomic shapes, expounded in section 1+2: . .
Besides this, those bodies that are indivisible and solid, out 
of which the compounds arise and into which they are dissolved, 
are incomprehensible in the varieties of their shapes; for it is 
not possible that so many varieties should arise out of' the same shapes, 
if their number is comprehended.: With respect to each shape-type,
then,, the like kinds are strictly infinite, while in the varieties 
they are not strictly infinite but only incomprehensible.
This passage suggests that Epicurus distinguished between three degrees or 
orders of magnitude, that is, denumerable, inconceivable, and infinite quantities. 
I believe that this distinction is deliberate and technical. In what follows,
I shall examine some passages in which I think the concept of an inconceivably 
large but nevertheless finite magnitude is operative; then I shall offer some 
general remarks on its significance for Epicurus' physical theory.
The first passage, from sections U6-1+7 of the Letter to Herodotus, is 
both a lengthy one and among the most difficult in the entire epistle. This is 
the text:
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Considerations of space oblige me to forego a review of the many extraordinary 
interpretations to which this paragraph has given rise. Suffice it to note 
that Usener emends drastically, Bailey, following Giussani, transposes the 
better part of it to sections 6l-62, and Hicks, in the Loeb translation^ goes 
a gpod way toward rewriting the original. I propose to offer my own translation 
and explanatory comments, invoking the distinctions drawn above between 
categories of magnitude, and I shall be content if my reading makes plausible 
sense of the passage. First, then, the translation:
(l) We call these forms idols. (2) Furthermore, the course 
through the void, coming against no opposition of deflecting 
(atoms), accomplishes every comprehensible distance in an 
unimaginable time. (3) For deflection and the absence of 
deflection take the likeness of slowness and speed. (U) Nor, 
indeed, with respect to the times visible through reason does 
the moving body also arrive together at the many places (for 
this is unintelligible), (5) and this body arriving together 
in perceptible time from somewhere in the infinite will not 
have set out from just any place whose course we may 
comprehend. (6) For,it will be like deflection, even if to 
a certain degree we take the speed of the course as not . 
deflected., (7) It is important to posit this factor too.
The first stage of the.argument (#2) I take to run like this: in the absence
of collisions,, atoms (or idols) will traverse all comprehensible, which is to 
say, denumerable distances in an imperceptibly brief interval of time. It 
should be noted that my analysis depends upon a rigorous use both of the term 
perilepton and its cognates,.for the translation of which I employ forms of the
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word "comprehensible," and of the term aperinoetoi, which I have rendered as 
"unimaginable" and which I understand to refer to the limits of mental repre­
sentation; in the next sentence but one (#H) Epicurus drives home the point 
that these limits are identical to those of perception, and must be sharply- 
distinguished from the limits of theoretical cognition. On this interpretation, 
the phrase "every comprehensible distance" excludes the category of measures 
that are incomprehensibly large. When two points on the trajectory of a 
particle are separated by a distance of incomprehensible magnitude, the interval 
between the times of arrival at the two positions would, I take it, be 
perceptible. This proposition is coordinate with the next, that on the level 
of theoretically discrete temporal intervals no object may be said to arrive 
simultaneously at two separate points along its path (#U). If our gauge is 
that of temporal minima, we can distinguish the moments of arrival at any two 
points. If the measure is perceptible units of time, then it is not possible 
to discriminate times of arrival when the distance between points is calculable, 
but if that distance should be incalculably great, the temporal interval should 
be a sensible one. To put the same hypothesis in different terms, if two 
particles set out from points of departure that are a calculable or 
comprehensible distance apart, it is not possible to distinguish in perception 
the times at which they reach an observer. If, however, they were to 
originate at positions separated by an incomprehensible distance, then their 
time of arrival would be discernibly different.
Epicurus then introduces a further qualification (#5).:, that even on the 
level of perceptible intervals of time, an object or idol arriving from a given 
point of departure in the universe will not have set out from ary place at all 
that happens to be at a comprehensible distance from the observer (ex hou an 
perilabomen ten phoran topou: phoran is the course or trajectory; the relative
hou with an and the subjunctive is a relative clause with indefinite antecedent 
(Smyth 2506); the ouk goes with aphistamenon). That is to say, some distances 
are excluded, even though they are not incomprehensibly large (perilabomen is 
interpreted strictly, as the verbal correlate to the adjective perilepton)♦
The reason for this is given in the following sentence (#6): idols do not in
fact behave like atoms which meet no obstacles in their course; to treat them 
so is merely a convenient approximation. Thus, for very large, though still 
comprehensible distances, the time required for an idol to traverse them may 
be perceptible.
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Epicurus’ 'reasoning is based on the Zenonian notion that to traverse, whether 
physically or mentally, a divisible stretch of territory, one must have 
accomplishedrindividually each of the potentially separable units into which 
the distance can ultimately be resolved* If division could go on without 
limit, then the mind, in scanning the dimensions of a finite body, would have 
to perform an infinite number of discrete operations, which is, for Epicurus, 
impossible. But if an atom is not composed of an infinite number of parts, 
is it necessarily the case that we are able to specify the precise number of 
parts comprised in any given atom? If so, we encounter the minimalist paradox 
in its most blatant form. For we should then be able to equate the size of 
the minimum part with a finite specifiable fraction of an atomic particle, and 
be obliged to deny the possible existence of a quantity half that size. All 
the problems which Gregory Vlastos has pointed out in connection with 
geometrical figures, such as a cube with sides of finite measure and 
incommensurable diagonals ("Minimal Parts in Ep. Atomism," 126-128), would 
immediately controvert the plausibility of Epicurus' theory. Vlastos' own 
solution, which is to take the minimum not as a mathematical or theoretical 
limit, but as a natural unit of volume, empirically verified, of which all 
atoms happen to be integral multiples, ignores, among other things, the 
essential relationship between minima and boundaries: a bit of matter whose
edges in one way or another are equal to the natural unit could certainly be 
said to have definable boundaries of its own, nor is there any reason at all 
why it could not be imagined as an independently subsisting entity. Moreover, 
the connection, if any, between the minima of distance, time, and the angle 
of swerve would be quite arbitrary. Furley's observation, on the other hand, 
that the minima, while assumed to be finite, nevertheless partake in some 
respects of the qualities of points, is offered as a statement of the paradox, 
not an answer to it. If the above discussion is right, however, there is a 
middle ground in Epicurean theory between the dimensionless point and the 
measurably small interval of Vlastos' account, that is, the inconceivably small 
quantity. Epicurus has given us all the elements necessary to define such a 
unit: when we scan the breadth of an atom, proceeding from part to minimal
part, we accomplish neither an infinite number of steps (which is impossible), 
nor a denumerably finite number (which, I submit, leads to insupportable 
inconsistencies), but inconceivably many steps, not strictly infinite, but 
incalculably large in quantity, exactly like the varieties of atomic shapes.
The minimum is, as it were, the inverse of this magnitude. Its property is to 
be smaller than any fraction we can name.
The idea of a positive quantity smaller than any specifiable number is 
not unrelated to the mathematics of Epicurus’ time. The method of proof by 
exhaustion, which is similar to the modern reformulation of the calculus in 
terms limits (for every delta, there exists an epsilon such that...), naturally 
gives rise to the intuition that all areas or volumes may be treated as 
multiples of some minuscule unit, too small to tag a number to but greater 
than zero. As Mau and others have pointed out, A.rchimedes' Method acknowledged 
the utility of such an assumption as a means of identifying, if not rigorously 
demonstrating, provable theorems. It seems to me that, given the Epicurean 
criterion of conceivability, there would be no obstacle to accepting such an 
intuitive notion as corresponding to an objective property of nature. Further­
more, on this interpretation the doctrine of minima eliminates the need for a 
strictly finitistic geometry, such as Vlastos demanded. For any measurable 
figure, all the laws of ordinary geometry will obtain. They fail only at the
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level'of the minimum itself, which has no parts, and therefore does not offer, 
for example, a diagonal to he measured against a side. As for the purely 
arithmetical relations or proportions at this order of magnitude, the 
Epicureans could argue that, if any numbers can be specified, then we are 
ipso facto above the realm of the true minimum.
I have argued in this section that Epicurus posited a distinct order of 
magnitude larger than any denumerable quantity but not infinite, whose inverse 
is, correspondingly, smaller than any specifiable quantity but not zero. What 
is the logical status of such a conception according to modem mathematical 
theory? It is not entirely implausible. For today the idea of the 
infinitesimal has been vindicated in mathematics, and it has been shown that 
the entire calculus can be consistently derived on the assumption of 
infinitesimal differentials (see A. Robinson, Won-Standard Analysis, 1966). 
Wow, Epicurus’ minima are not infinitesimals, since in finite, though 
inconceivably large, multiples they sum to finite quantities (e.g., the unit 
integer). The distinction between denumerable and non-denumerable infinities 
has been rigorously drawn, but, to the best of my knowledge, the class of 
finite non-denumerable quantities has not been defined in a useful or 
coherent way. Wevertheless, it was a good try on Epicurus' part. His third 
order of magnitude enabled him to evade the paradoxes of infinity, which 
plagues all Greek minds, without denying the validity of geometry for all 
calculable operations.
David Konstan 
Wesleyan University
Notes to follow.
